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Abstract
Competitive equilibrium is a central concept in economics with numerous applications beyond
markets, such as scheduling, fair allocation of goods, or bandwidth distribution in networks.
Computation of competitive equilibria has received a significant amount of interest in algorith-
mic game theory, mainly for the prominent case of Fisher markets. Natural and decentralized
processes like tatonnement and proportional response dynamics (PRD) converge quickly towards
equilibrium in large classes of Fisher markets. Almost all of the literature assumes that the
market is a static environment and that the parameters of agents and goods do not change over
time. In contrast, many large real-world markets are subject to frequent and dynamic changes.
In this paper, we provide the first provable performance guarantees of discrete-time taton-
nement and PRD in markets that are subject to perturbation over time. We analyze the promi-
nent class of Fisher markets with CES utilities and quantify the impact of changes in supplies of
goods, budgets of agents, and utility functions of agents on the convergence of tatonnement to
market equilibrium. Since the equilibrium becomes a dynamic object and will rarely be reached,
our analysis provides bounds expressing the distance to equilibrium that will be maintained via
tatonnement and PRD updates. Our results indicate that in many cases, tatonnement and PRD
follow the equilibrium rather closely and quickly recover conditions of approximate market clear-
ing. Our approach can be generalized to analyzing a general class of Lyapunov dynamical systems
with changing system parameters, which might be of independent interest.
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sponse Dynamics, Dynamic Markets
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1 Introduction
A central concept to understand trade in large markets is the notion of competitive or market
equilibrium. The computational aspects of competitive equilibria have been a central theme
in algorithmic game theory over the last decade, mainly for the prominent class of Fisher
markets. In a Fisher market, there are a set of agents or buyers and a set of divisible goods.
Each agent brings a budget of money to the market and wants to buy goods, for which she
has an increasing and concave utility function. An equilibrium consists of a vector of prices
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and an allocation of goods and money such that (1) every buyer purchases the most preferred
bundle of goods that she can afford, and (2) market clears (supply equals demand).
There are successful approaches based on distributed adaptation processes for converging
to market equilibria. For example, tatonnement is governed by the natural intuition that
prices for over-demanded goods increase, while under-demanded goods become cheaper.
It provides an explanation how decentralized price adjustment can lead a market into an
equilibrium state, thereby providing additional justification for the concept. Recently, several
works derived a detailed analysis and proved fast convergence of discrete-time tatonnement
in markets [8–11,13,14].
It is well-known that network rate control is closely related to Fisher market equilibria [21–
23]. Towards this end, distributed market dynamics called proportional response dynamics
(PRD) were proposed and analyzed in the context of peer-to-peer network sharing [24,29].
These dynamics avoid the usage of prices and work directly on the exchange and allocation
of goods. PRD and its generalizations converge toward market equilibria in the full range of
CES Fisher markets [5, 12,31].
While tatonnement and PRD rely on dynamic change of prices and allocation, the existing
literature assumes that the market and its properties (agents, budgets, utilities, supplies
of goods) remain static and unchanged over time. In fact, to the best of our knowledge,
all of the existing work on computation of market equilibrium in algorithmic game theory
assumes that the market is essentially a static environment. In contrast, in many (if not
all) applications of markets, the market itself is subject to dynamic change, in the sense
that supplies of goods changes over time, agents have different budgets at their disposal
that they can spend, or the preferences of agents expressed via utility functions evolve over
time. Analyzing and quantifying the impact of dynamic change in markets is critical to
understand the robustness of market equilibrium in general, and of price adaptation dynamics
like tatonnement in particular.
In this paper, we initiate the algorithmic study of dynamic markets in the form of dynam-
ically evolving environments. Our interest lies in the performance of dynamic adaptation
processes like tatonnement. We analyze a discrete-time process, where in each round t taton-
nement provides a price for each good, which is then updated using the excess demand for
each good. In each round t the excess demand comes from a possibly different, adversarially
perturbed market. This dynamic nature of markets gives rise to a number of interesting
issues. Notably, even when in each round t the market has a unique equilibrium, over time
this equilibrium becomes a dynamic object. As such, exact market equilibria can rarely
or never be reached. Instead, we consider how tatonnement can trace the equilibrium by
maintaining a small distance (in terms of suitably defined notions of distance), which also
results in approximate clearing conditions. For PRD, we apply a similar approach based on
adaptation of the allocation of goods.
More formally, we consider the prominent class of Fisher markets with agent utilities that
exhibit constant elasticity of substitution (CES). In this versatile framework, we analyze the
impact of changes in supply of goods, budgets of agents, and their utility parameters. The
adaptation approaches equilibrium conditions, but since the equilibrium is moving, prices
and allocations follow and chase the equilibrium point over time. Our analysis provides
distance bounds, which can be seen as a quantification of the extent of out-of-equilibrium
trade due to the interplay of market perturbation and adaptation of agents.
Technically, the majority of our analysis is concerned with quantifying the impact of
perturbation in market parameters on several potential functions that guarantee convergence
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of the dynamics. The results then follow by a combination with the convergence guarantees
for static markets. In fact, this approach constitutes a powerful framework to analyze a large
variety of protocols and dynamics that are well-understood in static systems, when these
systems become subject to dynamic perturbation. In the Appendix C, we discuss further
examples – gradient descent for strongly convex functions and diffusion for load balancing in
networked systems – where we quantify the performance of natural dynamics in the presence
of system perturbations.
Contribution and Outline. After presenting necessary preliminaries in Section 2, we
describe in Section 3 the general model for dynamic Fisher markets with CES utilities and a
general convergence result. In the subsequent sections, we discuss the insightful case of CES
markets with gross-substitute condition. In these markets, the total misspending (absolute
excess demand times price) over all goods is a natural parameter to quantify the violation of
market clearing conditions. Moreover, one round of tatonnement updates in static markets
is known to decrease misspending by a multiplicative factor [11]. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we
consider markets where the supply of goods, the budgets of agents, and the utility function
of the agents are subject to dynamic perturbation, respectively. We quantify the impact
of perturbation on the misspending in the market. These bounds reveal that the change is
often a rather mild additive change in misspending. Together with the fact that tatonnement
decreases the misspending multiplicatively, we see that the price adaptation is indeed able to
incorporate and adapt to the changes quickly. Overall, the dynamics can trace the equilibrium
point up to a distance that evolves from the change in a small number of recent rounds.
We can provide similar results for a more general approach for CES markets based on a
convex potential function [10]. A slight disadvantage is that this potential function does not
have an equally intuitive interpretation as the misspending function. On the other hand, it
applies to tatonnement in all CES Fisher markets (even without gross-substitute property).
The discussion of these results is deferred to Appendix B.
The technique we apply for markets can be executed much more generally for a class
of dynamical systems, which we outline in Section 4. These systems have a set of control
parameters (e.g., prices in markets, or strategic decisions in games) and system parameters
(e.g., supplies or utilities in markets, or payoff values in games). Moreover, these systems admit
a Lyapunov function, and a round-based adaptation process for the control parameters (e.g.,
tatonnement in markets, or best-response dynamics in classes of games) that multiplicatively
decreases the Lyapunov function in a single round. Our results provide a bound on the value
of the Lyapunov function when the system parameters are subject to dynamic change. We
discuss two additional examples of such systems based on minimization of strongly convex
functions and network load balancing in Appendix C.
In Section 5 we use a further generalization of the technique based on Bregman divergence
to show that proportional response dynamics can successfully trace equilibrium in gross-
substitute CES Fisher markets. A more general framework of dynamical systems governed
by progress in Bregman divergence is discussed in Appendix D. It seems likely that a similar
analysis based on our techniques can be conducted for many more sophisticated systems
with significantly more complex dynamics.
Related Work. Competitive equilibrium and tatonnement date back to Walras [28] in
1874. The existence of equilibrium was established in a non-constructive way for a general
setting by Arrow and Debreu [2] in 1954. Computation of equilibrium has been a central
subject in general equilibrium theory. In the past 15 years, there has been impressive
progress on devising efficent algorithms for computing equilibria, e.g., using network-flow
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algorithms [3, 4, 16–18,26], the ellipsoid method [20] or the interior point method [30].
Decentralized adaptation processes such as tatonnement are important due to their simple
nature and plausible applicability in real markets. Tatonnement is broadly defined as a
process that increases (resp. decreases) the price of a good if the demand for the good is more
(resp. less) than the supply. The price updates are distributed, since the price adjustment for
each good is in the direction of its own excess demand and is independent of the demands
for other goods.
Arrow, Block and Hurwitz [1] showed that a continuous version of tatonnement converges
to an equilibrium for markets satisfying the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. The
recent algorithmic advances provide new insights in analyzing tatonnement [10,13]. Cole and
Fleischer [14] proposed the ongoing market model, in which warehouses are introduced to
allow out-of-equilibrium trade, and prices are updated in tatonnement-style asynchronously,
to provide an in-market process which might capture how real markets work. There has
been significant recent interest in further aspects of ongoing markets or asynchronous
tatonnement [8, 9, 11,15].
In contrast, proportional response dynamics are a class of distributed algorithms that
originated in the literature on network bandwidth sharing. These dynamics work without
prices and come with convergence guarantees in classes of static network exchange, where
goods have a uniform value [29]. For the special class of Fisher markets with linear utilities
these dynamics can be cast as a form of gradient descent [5, 12,31].
Notions of games and markets with perturbation and dynamic change are only very
recently starting to receive increased interest in algorithmic game theory. For example, recent
work has started to quantify the average performance of simple auctions and regret-learning
agents in combinatorial auctions with dynamic buyer population [19,25]. In these scenarios,
however, equilibria are probabilistic objects and convergence in the static case can only be
shown in terms of regret on average in hindsight. Moreover, the main goal is to bound the
price of anarchy.
2 Preliminaries
Fisher Markets. In a Fisher market, there are n goods and m buyers. Each buyer i has
an amount bi of budget. Buyer i has a utility function ui representing her preference. For
bundles x1i = (x1ij)j=1,...,n and x2i = (x2ij)j=1,...,n, if ui(x1i1, · · · , x1in) > ui(x2i1, · · · , x2in), then
she prefers x1i to x2i . We denote the vector of budgets by b = (bi)i=1,...,m and the vector of
utility functions by u = (ui)i=1,...,m. Let B =
∑
i bi be the total budget in the market.
Given a vector p = (pj)j=1,...,n of (per-unit) prices for each good, buyer i requests a
demand bundle of goods that maximizes her utility function subject to the budget constraint:
xˆi = arg max
{
ui(xi) :
∑n
j=1 xij · pj ≤ bi
}
. In general, the arg max is a set of bundles. In
this paper, we concern strictly concave utility function only, for which there is a unique
demand bundle.
The sum of amount of good j purchased by all buyers is the demand for good j, denoted by
xj =
∑m
i=1 xˆij . The supply of good j is wj , and we set w = (wj)j=1,...,n. Let z = (zj)j=1,...,n
be the vector of excess demand, i.e., demand minus supply: zj = xj − wj .
A pair (x∗,p∗) is a competitive or market equilibrium if (1) each vector x∗i is a demand
of agent i at prices p∗, (2) for each good j with p∗j > 0, demand is equal to supply (i.e.,
p∗j · zj = 0), and (3) for each good j with p∗j = 0, demand is at most supply (i.e., zj ≤ 0). An
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equilibrium price vector p∗ is also called a vector of market clearing prices.
CES Utility Functions. A prominent class of utility functions in markets are utility
functions with Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES). They have the form ui(xi) =(∑n
j=1 aij · (xij)ρ
)1/ρ
, where 1 ≥ ρ > −∞ and all aij ≥ 0.
For ρ < 1 and ρ 6= 0, buyer i’s demand for good j is
xˆij = bi · (aij)
1−c(pj)c−1∑n
k=1(aik)1−c(pk)c
, where c = ρ
ρ− 1 .
Dynamic Markets. For CES Fisher markets, tatonnement is known to converge quickly to
equilibrium under static market conditions. We here consider a dynamic market where in the
beginning of each round t = 1, . . . , T our tatonnement dynamics propose a vector of prices
pt. Dynamic market parameters like budgets bt, supplies wt and utility functions ut are
manifested, which can be different from their value in previous rounds 0, . . . , t− 1. Agents
request a demand bundle based on the prices pt and marketMt = (ut,bt,wt), which yields
a vector of excess demands zt. Then the system proceeds to the next round t+ 1.
We first provide a basic insight that lies at the core of the analysis and manages to lift
convergence results for a class of static markets to a bound for dynamic markets from that
class. Formally, assume that the following properties hold:
Potential: There is a non-negative potential function Φ(M,p), for every market M =
(u,b,w) and every price vector p. It holds Φ(M,p) = 0 if and only if p is a vector of
clearing prices for marketM.
Price-Improvement: The price dynamics satisfy Φ(M,pt) ≤ (1− δ) · Φ(M,pt−1), for some
1 ≥ δ > 0 and every marketM.
Market-Perturbation: The market dynamics satisfy Φ(Mt,p) ≤ Φ(Mt−1,p) + ∆t, for some
values ∆t ≥ 0 and every price vector p.
I Proposition 1. Suppose the price and market dynamics satisfy the Potential, Price-
Improvement, and Market-Perturbation properties. Then
Φ(MT ,pT ) ≤ (1− δ)T · Φ(M0,p0) +
T−1∑
t=1
(1− δ)T−t∆t .
Let ∆ = maxt=1,...,T ∆t, then it follows for any t ≤ T
Φ(MT ,pT ) ≤
T∑
τ=t+1
(1− δ)T−τ∆τ + (1− δ)
T−t
δ
·∆ + (1− δ)T · Φ(M0,p0) .
The proof follows by a direct application of the three properties. We prove it for a much
more general class of dynamic systems with Lyapunov functions in Section 4.
Consider the three terms in the latter bound for Φ. The first term captures the impact
of recent changes to the market. The second term bounds the effect of all older changes.
The third term decays exponentially over time. Hence, when the process runs long enough,
the potential is only affected by recent changes of the market, while all older changes can
be accumulated into a constant term based on ∆ and δ. Intuitively, the price dynamics
follows the evolution of the equilibrium up to a “distance” of ∆/δ in the potential function
value. Hence, if market perturbation ∆ is small and price improvement δ is large, the process
succeeds to maintain market clearing conditions almost exactly.
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3 Dynamic Fisher Markets and Misspending
For simplicity, we here describe our techniques for CES marketsM with gross-substitutes
property, i.e., when all buyers have CES utilities with 1 > ρ > 0. For a study of general CES
Fisher markets see Appendix B below.
The tatonnement process we analyze here updates prices in each round based on the
excess demand in the last round, i.e.,
ptj ← pt−1j ·
[
1 + λ ·min
(
xt−1j − wj
wj
, 1
) ]
, (1)
where λ < 1 is a parameter depending on ρ. The misspending potential function [11, 15] is
ΦMS(M,p) =
n∑
j=1
pj · |zj | .
The tatonnement process is known to have the Price-Improvement property based on the
misspending potential function ΦMS in CES markets with 1 > ρ > 0. More formally, let
ρmax := maxmi=1 ρi, if λ ≤ Θ(1 − ρmax), then there exists 1 ≥ δ = δ(λ) > 0 such that
ΦMS(M,pt) ≤ (1− δ) · ΦMS(M,pt−1). [15]
3.1 Dynamic Supply and Budgets
Dynamic Supply. Let us first analyze the impact of changing supply on tatonnement
dynamics and market clearing conditions. We normalize the initial supply w1j = 1 for each
good j. Suppose that the supplies are then changed additively1 by εt = (εt1, εt2, · · · , εtn) at
time t. We parametrize our bounds using the maximum supply change κ = maxt ‖εt‖.
Assumption 1. Every price is universally bounded by some time-independent constant P ,
i.e., for any j and any time t, we have ptj ≤ P .
Assumption 1 is made for technical reasons, but it is simple to satisfy by constant
parameters of the market. For example, if all initial prices are at most B, then since λ < 1
Assumption 1 holds with P = 2B. The main result in this section is as follows.
I Proposition 2. For any t ≤ T ,
ΦMS(MT ,pT ) ≤ P ·
(
T∑
τ=t+1
(1− δ)T−τ‖ετ‖1 + (1− δ)
T−t
δ
· κ
)
+(1−δ)T ·ΦMS(M0,p0) .
Proof. Consider the misspending potential ΦMS. Tatonnement satisfies the Price-Improvement
property. Hence, to show the result, we establish the Market-Perturbation property.
Note that the misspending potential can be given by
ΦMS(Mt,pt) =
n∑
j=1
ptj ·
∣∣∣∣∣xtj − 1−
t∑
τ=1
ετj
∣∣∣∣∣ .
1 We here study additive change for mathematical convenience. The bounds can be adjusted to hold
accordingly for multiplicative change.
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Hence, by the triangle inequality and Assumption 1,
ΦMS(Mt,p) = ΦMS(Mt−1,p) +
n∑
j=1
pj ·
∣∣εtj∣∣ ≤ ΦMS(Mt−1,p) + P · ‖εt‖1 .
Thus, using Proposition 1 with ∆t = P · ‖εt‖1 and ∆ = Pκ, the proof follows. J
Remark. If the supplies of all goods shrink multiplicatively by the same factor of (1−β) per
time step, then in markets with CES utility functions, it is well-known that the equilibrium
price of every good increases by a factor of (1−β)−1 per time step. However, the tatonnement
update rule allows the current price to be increased by a factor of at most (1 + λ) per time
step. Thus, for plausible tracing of equilibrium, λ should satisfy (1 + λ) > (1− β)−1.
Dynamic Budgets. We now analyze the impact of changing buyer budgets on tatonnement
dynamics and market clearing conditions. Starting from the initial budgets, the budgets
are then changed additively by εt = (εt1, εt2, · · · , εtm) at time t. We parametrize our bounds
using the maximum budget change η = maxt ‖εt‖1. For a proof of the following proposition,
see Appendix A.1.
I Proposition 3. For any t ≤ T ,
ΦMS(MT ,pT ) ≤
T∑
τ=t+1
(1− δ)T−τ‖ετ‖1 + (1− δ)
T−t
δ
· η + (1− δ)T · ΦMS(M0,p0) .
3.2 Dynamic Buyer Utility
In this section, we analyze the impact of changing the parameters aij in the CES utility
functions on tatonnement dynamics and market clearing conditions. Starting from the initial
utility values, each aij can in each round be changed by some multiplicative factor γtij . Let
γt = maxi,j((γtij)
1
1−ρ , (1/γtij)
1
1−ρ ) and γ = maxt γt.
I Proposition 4. For any t ≤ T ,
ΦMS(MT ,pT ) ≤ B ·
(
T∑
τ=t+1
(1− δ)T−τ · 2(γ
τ − 1)
γτ + 1 +
(1− δ)T−t
δ
· 2(γ − 1)
γ + 1
)
+ (1− δ)T · ΦMS(M0,p0) .
Proof. To show the result, we establish the Market-Perturbation property. Note that the
misspending potential can be given by
ΦMS(Mt,pt) =
n∑
j=1
ptj ·
∣∣xtj − wj∣∣ = n∑
j=1
ptj ·
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
bi ·
(aij
∏t
τ=1 γ
τ
ij)1−c(pj)c−1∑n
k=1(aik
∏t
τ=1 γ
τ
ik)1−c(pk)c
− wj
∣∣∣∣∣ .
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Using at−1ij = aij
∏t−1
τ=1 γ
τ
ij we derive
∆t = ΦMS(Mt,p)− ΦMS(Mt−1,p)
=
n∑
j=1
pj ·
(∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
bi ·
(at−1ij γtij)1−c(pj)c−1∑n
k=1(a
t−1
ik γ
t
ik)1−c(pk)c
− wj
∣∣∣∣∣ −
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
bi ·
(at−1ij )1−c(pj)c−1∑n
k=1(a
t−1
ik )1−c(pk)c
− wj
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤
n∑
j=1
pj ·
m∑
i=1
bi ·
∣∣∣∣∣ (a
t−1
ij γ
t
ij)1−c(pj)c−1∑n
k=1(a
t−1
ik γ
t
ik)1−c(pk)c
− (a
t−1
ij )1−c(pj)c−1∑n
k=1(a
t−1
ik )1−c(pk)c
∣∣∣∣∣
=
m∑
i=1
bi ·
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣ (a
t−1
ij γ
t
ij)1−c pcj∑n
k=1(a
t−1
ik γ
t
ik)1−c pck
− (a
t−1
ij )1−c pcj∑n
k=1(a
t−1
ik )1−c pck
∣∣∣∣∣ .
For the rest of the proof, we construct an upper bound on the difference of two fractions.
Fix a buyer i. We set αj =
(at−1
ij
)1−c pcj∑n
k=1
(at−1
ik
)1−c pc
k
and βj = (γtij)1−c. Moreover, we use µ = γt
and observe µ ≥ βj ≥ 1/µ. We let
∆sj =
∣∣∣∣∣ (a
t−1
ij γ
t
ij)1−c pcj∑n
k=1(a
t−1
ik γ
t
ik)1−c pck
− (a
t−1
ij )1−c pcj∑n
k=1(a
t−1
ik )1−c pck
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ αjβj∑
k αkβk
− αj
∣∣∣∣ .
I Lemma 5. There exists a vector (β′1, . . . , β′m) with
β′j =
µ if
αjβ
′
j∑
k
αkβ′k
≥ αj
1/µ otherwise.
such that ∑
j
∆sj ≤
∑
j
∣∣∣∣ αjβ′j∑
k αkβ
′
k
− αj
∣∣∣∣ .
For a proof of the lemma, see Appendix A.2. Now let β′ be a vector as in the previous
lemma, let S = {j : β′j = µ} and R = G \ S. Using αS =
∑
j∈S αj , we obtain
∑
j
∆sj ≤
∑
j∈S
αjµ∑
k∈S αkµ+
∑
i∈R αi/µ
−
∑
j∈S
αj

+
∑
j∈R
αj −
∑
j∈R
αj/µ∑
k∈S αkµ+
∑
i∈R αi/µ

=
(
µαS
µαS + (1− αS)/µ − αS
)
+
(
1− αS − (1− αS)/µ
µαS + (1− αS)/µ
)
= 1− 2αS +
(
µ+ 1µ
)
αS − 1µ(
µ− 1µ
)
αS + 1µ
.
This expression is maximized at αS = 1µ+1 and yields an upper bound of
∑
j ∆sj ≤ 2(µ−1)µ+1 .
Thus, using Proposition 1 with ∆t ≤ B · 2(γt−1)γt+1 and ∆ ≤ B · 2(γ−1)γ+1 , we are done. J
4 Parametrized Lyapunov Dynamical Systems
In this section, we prove a general theorem, which includes as special case the bound shown
for markets in Proposition 1. Our focus here are dynamical systems, in which time is discrete
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and represented by non-negative integers. Note, however, that the formulation below can be
easily generalized to settings with continous time.
We assume that the dynamical system can be described by two sets of parameters. There
is a set of control variables that can be adjusted by an algorithm or a protocol. In addition,
there is a set of system parameters that can change in each round in an adversarial way. For
example, in our analysis of markets in the previous section, the control variables are prices
of goods, whereas system parameters can be supplies of goods, budgets of agents, or utility
parameters. As another example, in games the control variables could be the strategy choices
of agents, whereas system parameters are utility and payoff values of states. More generally,
control variables could also be bird headings in a bird flock, while system parameters are
wind direction or velocity, etc.
The classical theory of dynamical systems often studies the behaviour of systems with
static system parameters. However, dynamical systems with varying system parameters often
arise in practice (see Appendix C for some examples). Here, we propose a simple framework
to analyze Lyapunov dynamical systems with varying system parameters. More formally,
the dynamical system L is described by an initial control variable vector p0 ∈ Rn and an
evolution rule F : Rn → Rn, which specifies how the control variables are adjusted. For each
time t ≥ 1, we have pt = F (pt−1).
The system L is called a Lyapunov dynamical system (LDS) if it admits a Lyapunov
function G : Rn → R+ such that
(a) for every fixed point (equilibrium) p of F with F (p) = p it holds G(p) = 0;
(b) for every p ∈ Rn it holds G(F (p)) ≤ G(p).
An LDS L is called linearly converging (LCLDS) if it further satisfies
(c) there exists a decay parameter δ = δ(L) > 0 such that for any p ∈ Rn, G(F (p)) ≤ (1−
δ) ·G(p).
Let L be a family of dynamical systems, while each dynamical system Ls ∈ L is
parametrized by a system parameter vector s ∈ Rd. The family L is called a family
of parametrized, linearly converging LDS (PLCLDS) if each Ls ∈ L is an LCLDS and
δ(L) = infLs∈L δ(Ls) > 0. For each Ls, we denote its evolution rule by Fs and its Lyapunov
function by Gs.
In many scenarios, particularly in agent-based dynamical systems, the control variables p
change by the evolution rule that expresses, e.g., the sequential decisions of the agents, but
the system parameters s can change in an exogenous (or even adversarial) way. However, in
many cases the impact of changes in a single time step is rather mild. The following theorem
states our recovery result by relating the Lyapunov value to the magnitude of changes in
each step. Intuitively, it characterizes the “distance” that the evolution rule maintains to a
fixed point over the course of the dynamics.
I Theorem 6. Let L be a PLCLDS with δ ≡ δ(L) > 0, let s0, s1, . . . , sT denote the system
parameter vectors at times 0, 1, · · · , T , respectively, and let Φ(st,pt) = Gst(pt). Suppose
that for every t = 1, . . . , T the system parameters st−1, st ∈ Rd invoke a change such that
for every p ∈ Rn, we have Φ(st,p) ≤ Φ(st−1,p) + ∆t. The initial control variable vector is
denoted by p0, and the system evolves such that for every t ≥ 1 we have pt = Fst−1(pt−1).
Then
Φ(sT ,pT ) ≤ (1− δ)T · Φ(s0,p0) +
T∑
t=1
(1− δ)T−t ·∆t .
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Let ∆ = maxt=1,...,T ∆t, then it follows for any t ≤ T
Φ(sT ,pT ) ≤
T∑
τ=t+1
(1− δ)T−τ∆τ + (1− δ)
T−t
δ
·∆ + (1− δ)T · Φ(s0,p0) .
Proof. For any time t ≥ 1,
Φ(st,pt) = Gst(pt) ≤ Gst−1(pt) + ∆t
= Gst−1(Fst−1(pt−1)) + ∆t
≤ (1− δ) ·Gst−1(pt−1) + ∆t = (1− δ) · Φ(st−1,pt−1) + ∆t.
Iterating the above recurrence yields the first result. For the second result, note that
t∑
τ=1
(1−δ)T−τ∆τ ≤ ∆(1− δ)T ·
t∑
τ=1
(
1
1− δ
)τ
= ∆ · (1− δ)
T+1
δ
·
((
1
1− δ
)t+1
− 11− δ
)
< ∆ · (1− δ)
T
δ
·
(
1
1− δ
)t
. J
In the scenarios where
∑T
t=1 ∆t = O(Tα) for small constant α, we have the following corollary.
I Corollary 7. In the setting of Theorem 6, if
∑T
t=1 ∆t = O(Tα) for some constant α > 0,
then for any constant β > 0,
Φ(sT ,pT ) ≤
T∑
τ=T−dα+βδ logTe+1
∆τ + O(T−β) + (1− δ)T · Φ(s0,p0).
As T →∞, the last two terms of the above inequality diminish. The bound is dominated
by the first term, which describes the impact of the changes in the recent O
(
logT
δ
)
steps.
5 Proportional Response Dynamics
In the Fisher market setting, the general protocol of proportional response dynamics (PRD)
is as follows. In each round, each buyer i splits her budget bi among the n goods according
to some rule, and send the bids to the sellers of the corresponding goods. Based on the
bids gathered from all buyers, the seller of each good j send back (simple) signals to buyers,
which are then used by buyers for updating their bids in the next round. We summarize the
notation and results we need from Cheung, Cole and Tao [12] below. When buyer i splits her
budget bi among the n goods, let bij denote the spending by her on good j. Let B denote
{bij}i∈[m],j∈[n]. Let pj :=
∑
i bij .
Consider the substitute domain, i.e., when the ρi parameters of all buyers are strictly
between 0 and 1. In each round, the seller of good j distributes the good among buyers in
proportion to the bids received, and then after receiving the goods, each buyer splits her
budget in proportion to the utility generated from the quantity of each good received. More
formally, let ptj =
∑
i b
t
ij , then the update rule is
bt+1ij = bi · aij
(
btij
ptj
)ρi /(∑
k
aik
(
btik
ptk
)ρi)
(2)
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The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence is similar to a distance measure. For vectors x and
y such that
∑
j xj =
∑
j yj , the explicit formula is KL(x||y) :=
∑
j xj · ln xjyj . The above
update rule is equivalent to mirror descent w.r.t. the KL divergence (but with different step
sizes for different buyers) of the same function:
g(B) = −
∑
ij
bij
ρi
log aij(bij)
ρi−1
(pj)ρi
, (3)
defined on the domain C =
{
B
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i, ∑j bij = bi and ∀i, j, bij ≥ 0
}
. For our purpose,
it suffices to know that any equilibrium B∗ ∈ C of PRD corresponds to a minimum point of
g. The market potential with proportional response dynamics will be defined as:
G(B) = g(B)− g(B∗) (4)
Cheung, Cole and Tao [12] show that for positive constants q1 < q2 (which depend on the
maximum and minimum values of ρi) the market potential in a static market is bounded by
G(Bt+1) ≤ q1 · KL(B∗,Bt) − q2 · KL(B∗,Bt+1).
In the rest of the section, we analyze the impact of changing utility functions and supplies
on the convergence properties of proportional response dynamics. For the varying budgets
case, the domain C varies too, prohibiting a similar analysis.
Dynamic Buyer Utilities. Starting with the initial utility parameters, suppose that each
aik changes by a factor within [e−ε, eε]. For a given budget allocation B, let G(Mt,B) denote
the market potential for the utility of the buyers in round t, and Bt,∗ ∈ C the allocation
that minimizes G(Mt,B).
I Proposition 8. After T rounds, it holds that
G(MT , BT ) ≤ q1
(
q1
q2
)T−1
· KL(B0,∗,B0) + q2
q2 − q1 ·∆ ,
where
∆ =
∑
i
(
bi(eκi − 1)
1− ρi ·
∣∣∣∣ρi log(Bbi
)
− log
(
min
t,j
atij∑
k a
t
ik
)∣∣∣∣+ 2biερi
)
,
and κi = 2ε (1− ci (3− 2 mini ci)), where ci = ρi/(ρi − 1).
To prove this, we show in the following Claim 9 that the potential (4) satisfies a Market-
Perturbation property with the value of ∆ specified in the proposition.
I Claim 9. For any round t ≤ T it holds
G(Mt+1, Bt+1) ≤ q1 · KL(Bt,∗,Bt) − q2 · KL(Bt+1,∗,Bt+1) + 2
∑
i
biε
ρi
+
∑
i
bi(eκi − 1) · |logCi − log Πi| ,
where Ci =
(
B
bi
) ρi
1−ρi is a constant and Πi =
(
min
t,j
atij∑
k
at
ik
) 1
1−ρi
.
XX:12 Tracing Equilibrium in Dynamic Markets via Distributed Adaptation
Proof Sketch. Consider the function g defined above, and let gt(B) = g(Mt,B) be function
g in round t with utility coefficients {atij}. We have
gt(Bt+1)− gt(Bt,∗) ≤ q1 · KL(Bt,∗,Bt) − q2 · KL(Bt,∗,Bt+1).
To be able to prove this claim, we need to derive an inequality of the following form:
gt+1(Bt+1)− gt+1(Bt+1,∗) ≤ q1 · KL(Bt,∗,Bt) − q2 · KL(Bt+1,∗,Bt+1) + ∆t.
This inequality is implied by the first one whenever ∆t is chosen large enough to satisfy
∆t ≥
[
gt+1(Bt+1)− gt(Bt+1)
]
+
[
gt(Bt,∗)− gt+1(Bt+1,∗)
]
+ q2 ·
[
KL(Bt+1,∗,Bt+1)− KL(Bt,∗,Bt+1)] .
We choose a value for ∆t that satisfies the even larger lower bound of[
gt+1(Bt+1)− gt(Bt+1)
]
+
[
gt(Bt+1,∗)− gt+1(Bt+1,∗)
]
+ q2 ·
[
KL(Bt+1,∗,Bt+1)− KL(Bt,∗,Bt+1)] (5)
≤ 2
(∑
i
biε
ρi
)
+ q2 ·
[
KL(Bt+1,∗,Bt+1)− KL(Bt,∗,Bt+1)]
≤ ∆t
The first inequality follows since for any B, we have gt+1(B)− gt(B) = −
∑
ij
bij
ρi
log a
t+1
ij
at
ij
and maxj | log(at+1ij /atij)| = ε. Finally, we derive an upper bound on the third term in
Appendix A.3. This yields the final value of ∆t and proves the claim. J
Proof of Proposition 8. Now suppose ∆ is given as in the proposition, then with the above
claim it follows that:
q2 · KL(Bt+1,∗,Bt+1) ≤ q1 · KL(Bt,∗,Bt) + ∆. (6)
The potential of the market at round T can be bounded by
GT (BT ) ≤ q1 · KL(BT−1,∗,BT−1) + ∆
≤ q1
(
q1
q2
· KL(BT−2,∗,BT−2) + ∆
q2
)
+ ∆
≤ q1 ·
(
q1
q2
)T−1
· KL(B0,∗,B0) + q2
q2 − q1 ·∆,
where the inequalities follow by recursive application of (6). J
Dynamic Supplies. It turns out that the case with varying supplies can be reduced to
the case with varying utility functions. To see this, note that the function g defined in (3)
assumes that the supply of each good is normalized to be one unit. When the supply of good
j is changed from 1 to e, by performing a re-normalization of the supply, it is equivalent to
changing aij to aij · eρi .
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A Missing Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
To show the result, we establish the Market-Perturbation property. Note that the misspending
potential can be given by
ΦMS(Mt,pt) =
n∑
j=1
ptj ·
∣∣xtj − wj∣∣ = n∑
j=1
ptj ·
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
(
b1i +
t∑
τ=1
ετi
)
· (aij)
1−c(pj)c−1∑n
k=1(aik)1−c(pk)c
− wj
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Hence, by the triangle inequality,
ΦMS(Mt,p) ≤
n∑
j=1
pj ·
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
(
b1i +
t−1∑
τ=1
ετi
)
· (aij)
1−c(pj)c−1∑n
k=1(aik)1−c(pk)c
− wj
∣∣∣∣∣
+
n∑
j=1
pj ·
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
εti ·
(aij)1−c(pj)c−1∑n
k=1(aik)1−c(pk)c
∣∣∣∣∣
= ΦMS(Mt−1,p) +
n∑
j=1
pj ·
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
εti ·
(aij)1−c(pj)c−1∑n
k=1(aik)1−c(pk)c
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ΦMS(Mt−1,p) +
m∑
i=1
|εti| ·
n∑
j=1
pj · (aij)
1−c(pj)c−1∑n
k=1(aik)1−c(pk)c
= ΦMS(Mt−1,p) + ‖εt‖1
Thus, using Proposition 1 with ∆t = ‖εt‖1 and ∆ = η, the proof follows. J
A.2 Proof of Lemma 5
We describe a simple algorithm to compute such a vector β′ and prove the lemma. Initially,
set β0 = β and partition the set G of goods into sets S0 =
{
j ∈ G | αjβ
0
j∑
k
αkβ0k
≥ αj
}
and
R0 = G \ S. This yields
∑
j
∆sj =
∑
j
∣∣∣∣∣ αjβ0j∑k αkβ0k − αj
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
j∈S0
αjβ
0
j∑
k αkβ
0
k
− αj +
∑
j∈R0
αj −
αjβ
0
j∑
k αkβ
0
k
=
∑
j∈S0 αjβ
0
j −
∑
j∈R0 αjβ
0
j∑
k αkβ
0
k
−
∑
j∈S0
αj +
∑
j∈R0
αj .
For j ∈ S0, the derivative of this expression for β0j is
αj
(
2
∑
k∈R0 αkβ
0
k
)
(
∑
k
αkβ0k)2
, whereas for j ∈ R0 it
is −αj
(
2
∑
k∈R0 αkβ
0
k
)
(
∑
k
αkβ0k)2
. Now, we call a good j consistent if j ∈ S0 and β0j = µ, or j ∈ R0 and
β0j = 1/µ. If all goods are consistent, we are done. Otherwise, we can pick any inconsistent
good j and move β0j to the exteme value (either to µ when j ∈ S0 or 1/µ when j ∈ R0).
We name the resulting vector β1 and repeat the process: Construct S1 and R1, find any
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inconsistent good and move its value to the exteme value. We repeat the process until all
goods are consistent.
Suppose in some round ` − 1 we increase j ∈ S`−1 to β`j = µ. Then the expression
αjβ
`
j∑
k
αkβ`k
will increase. Hence, since j ∈ S`−1 it must hold j ∈ S` and, thus,
µ
αjµ+
∑
k αkβ
`−1
k
≥ 1 . (7)
Now consider any good j′ with β`−1j′ = µ. It must be j′ ∈ S` since using Eq. (7)
αj′β
`
j′∑
k αkβ
`
k
= αj
′µ
αjµ+
∑
k αkβ
`−1
k
≥ αj′ .
Now suppose in some round `− 1 we decrease j ∈ R`−1 to β`j = 1/µ. Now consider any good
j′ ∈ S`−1. Since the expression for j′ only increases, we have j′ ∈ S`.
These observations show that if in some iteration `′ we have inconsistent j′ ∈ S`′ and raise
the value to β`
′+1
j′ = µ, then j′ ∈ S` and remains consistent for every ` ≥ `′. Using similar
arguments, it follows that if in some iteration `′ we have inconsistent j′ ∈ R`′ and lower the
value to β`
′+1
j′ = 1/µ, then j′ ∈ R` and remains consistent for every ` ≥ `′. Thus, after at
most n iterations, the process is done and a consistent vector β′ has evolved. Furthermore,
all adjustments are non-decreasing for the overall expression, and we obtain an upper bound
on
∑
j ∆sj . J
A.3 Proof of Claim 9
To finish the proof, it remains to bound third term in (5). The explicit expression for the
third term is∑
ij
(
b∗,t+1ij · log
b∗,t+1ij
bt+1ij
− b∗,tij · log
b∗,tij
bt+1ij
)
. (8)
Recall that by setting ci = ρi/(ρi − 1), at p∗,t, the total demand for each good j is one, i.e.,
∑
i
bi ·
(atij)1−ci(p
∗,t
j )ci−1∑n
k=1(atik)1−ci(p
∗,t
k )ci
= 1. (9)
Now, suppose that each aik changes by a factor within [e−ε, eε]. Let j = arg maxk(p
∗,t+1
k /p
∗,t
k ),
and let α = p∗,t+1j /p
∗,t
j ≥ 1. In the substitute domain, the new total demand for good j is
∑
i
bi ·
(at+1ij )1−ci(p
∗,t+1
j )ci−1∑n
k=1(a
t+1
ik )1−ci(p
∗,t+1
k )ci
≤
∑
i
bi ·
[
(atij)1−ci · eε(1−ci)
] [
(p∗,tj )ci−1 · αci−1
]∑n
k=1
[
(atik)1−ci · e−ε(1−ci)
] [
(p∗,tk )ci · αci
]
=
∑
i
bi · e
2ε(1−ci)
α
·
[
(atij)1−ci
] [
(p∗,tj )ci−1
]∑n
k=1 [(atik)1−ci ]
[
(p∗,tk )ci
]
≤ e
2ε(1−mini ci)
α
. (by (9))
But note that the new total demand is also 1. Thus, α ≤ e2ε(1−mini ci), and hence for every
good k, p∗,t+1k /p
∗,t
k ≤ e2ε(1−mini ci).
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Symmetrically, we can also prove that for every good k, p∗,t+1k /p
∗,t
k ≥ e−2ε(1−mini ci). To
conclude, we show that
(p∗,t+1k /p
∗,t
k ) ∈ [e−δ, eδ], where δ = 2ε(1−mini ci).
Next, note that
bt,∗ij = bi ·
(atij)1−ci(p
∗,t
j )ci∑n
k=1(atik)1−ci(p
∗,t
k )ci
while
bt+1,∗ij = bi ·
(at+1ij )1−ci(p
∗,t+1
j )ci∑n
k=1(a
t+1
ik )1−ci(p
∗,t+1
k )ci
.
Since (at+1ik /atik) ∈ [e−ε, eε] and (p∗,t+1k /p∗,tk ) ∈ [e−δ, eδ], it is clear that
bt+1,∗ij
bt,∗ij
∈
[
e−2(ε(1−ci)−ciδ) , e2(ε(1−ci)−ciδ)
]
=:
[
e−κi , eκi
]
Now we come back to (8). Note that ∂∂t
(
t log tq
)
= log tq +1. Since
∑
ij b
∗,t+1
ij =
∑
ij b
∗,t
ij ,
we can ignore the constant +1 in the above partial derivative, and then bound (8) by
∑
ij
∣∣∣b∗,t+1ij − b∗,tij ∣∣∣ ·
(
the maximum possible value of max
t
{∣∣∣∣∣log b
∗,t′
ij
btij
∣∣∣∣∣
} )
. (10)
Without further assumption, the maximum possible value of maxt,t′
{∣∣∣∣log b∗,t′ijbt
ij
∣∣∣∣} can be
arbitrarily big, since we might have a very tiny (yet positive) value of b0ij . On the other hand,
clearly, both btij and b
∗,t′
ij is upper bounded by bi.
So it suffices to derive a lower bound for btij and b
∗,t′
ij . Since b
∗,t′
ij is an equilibrium value
and it can be reached arbitrarily closely in the static setting, a lower bound for btij will carry
through as a lower bound for b∗,t
′
ij .
By (2), if btij ≥ q, then
bt+1ij ≥ bi ·
ai,min · (q/B)ρi∑
k aik
.
Thus, the value of qi which satisfies the equation qi = bi · ai,min·(qi/B)
ρi∑
k
aik
can serve as a lower
bound of btij , provided that b0ij ≥ qi. The equation solves to
qi =
(
bi · ai,min∑
k aik
· 1
Bρi
)1/(1−ρi)
.
Note that in the above bound, we deliberately ignore the fact that the values of aik is
changing, so as to avoid cluster of algebra. We may simply replace ai,min∑
k
aik
by mint,j
atij∑
k
at
ik
to complete the proof.
Using this lower bound together with the fact that b
t+1,∗
ij
bt,∗
ij
∈ [e−κ , eκ] we can now bound (10)
as:
∑
i
bi(eκi − 1) ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣log
 biBρi/1−ρi(
bi mint,j
at
ij∑
k
at
ik
)1/1−ρi

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∑
i
bi(eκi − 1) |logCi − log Πi| ,
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where Ci =
(
B
bi
) ρi
1−ρi is a constant and Πi =
(
min
t,j
atij∑
k
at
ik
) 1
1−ρi
. This proves Claim 9. J
B Dynamic Fisher Markets via Convex Potential Functions
Suppose each buyer i has a CES utility function ui(xi) =
(∑n
j=1 aij · (xij)ρ
)1/ρ
, where
1 ≥ ρ > −∞ and aij ≥ 0.2 Let c = ρ/(ρ− 1). Recall that wj is the supply of good j. The
convex potential function for a static CES Fisher market is [10]
ΨCPF(M,p) =
n∑
j=1
wj · pj −
∑
i
bi · lnQi(p), where Qi(p) =
(
n∑
k=1
(aik)1−c(pk)c
)1/c
.
Note that Qi(p) is independent of the supplies of goods and the budgets of buyers; it can
be interpreted as the minimum amount of money buyer i needs to use to earn one unit of
utility [7]. The minimum value of ΨCPF(M,p) is not zero in general. Hence, for applying
our general framework that requires zero-value at the minimum, we use a normalized version
ΦCPF(M,p) := ΨCPF(M,p)−Ψ∗CPF(M), where Ψ∗CPF(M) := minp ΨCPF(M,p).
We study the following tatonnement price-update rule:
pt+1j ← ptj ·
[
1 + λ ·min{1 , ztj}
]
, (11)
where λ is a constant satisfying 0 < λ < 1/6.
Let Ψ∗CPF(M) denote the minimum value of the function ΨCPF(M). The following theorem,
stated in a simplified format from [10], demonstrates the Price-Improvement property.
I Theorem 10 ( [10]). Let p0 denote the initial prices and p∗ denote the mark et equilibrium.
Suppose prices are updated according to the rule (11). If minj p0j/p∗j ≥ q > 0, then there exists
δ = δ(q, λ) > 0 such that for any time t ≥ 0, it holds ΨCPF(M,pt+1)−Ψ∗CPF(M) ≤ (1−
δ) · (ΨCPF(M,pt)−Ψ∗CPF(M)).
For our dynamic environment, we denote the market at time t byMt = (ut,bt,wt), and
ΨCPF(Mt,pt) =
n∑
j=1
wtj ·ptj −
∑
i
bti · lnQti(pt), where Qti(p) =
(
n∑
k=1
(atik)1−c(pk)c
)1/c
.
Let Ψ∗,tCPF = minp ΨCPF(Mt,p), and ΦCPF(Mt,p) = ΨCPF(Mt,p)−Ψ∗,tCPF.
Similar to our analysis with the misspending potential function, we establish the Market-
Perturbation property in case supplies, budgets and utility functions are changing dynamically.
B.1 Dynamic Supply
Here, we consider the cases when the supplies are changing, while buyers’ budgets and utility
functions are fixed. Thus, the function Qti and budget bti does not change over time, and we
2 For simplicity, we assume all CES utility functions have the same ρ; but the convex potential function
works even with distinct ρ’s after some obvious modifications.
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write Qi and bi instead.
ΦCPF(Mt+1,pt+1) = ΨCPF(Mt+1,pt+1)−Ψ∗,t+1CPF
≤
 n∑
j=1
wtj · pt+1j −
∑
i
bi · lnQi(pt+1) − Ψ∗,tCPF
 + n∑
j=1
pt+1j ·
∣∣wt+1j − wtj∣∣ + (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF )
=
[
ΨCPF(Mt,pt+1)−Ψ∗,tCPF
]
+
n∑
j=1
pt+1j ·
∣∣wt+1j − wtj∣∣ + (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF )
≤ (1− δ) · [ΨCPF(Mt,pt)−Ψ∗,tCPF] + P · n∑
j=1
∣∣wt+1j − wtj∣∣ + (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF )
= (1− δ) · ΦCPF(Mt,pt) + P‖εt‖ + (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF ).
Now we proceed to bounding (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF ). Let p∗,t+1 denote the price vector which
attains the minimum value of ΨCPF(Mt+1,p). Then
Ψ∗,t+1CPF =
n∑
j=1
wt+1j · p∗,t+1j −
∑
i
bi · lnQi(p∗,t+1)
≥
n∑
j=1
wtj · p∗,t+1j −
∑
i
bi · lnQi(p∗,t+1) −
n∑
j=1
p∗,t+1j ·
∣∣wt+1j − wtj∣∣
≥ Ψ∗,tCPF −
n∑
j=1
p∗,t+1j ·
∣∣wt+1j − wtj∣∣ (by definition of Ψ∗,tCPF)
≥ Ψ∗,tCPF − B‖εt‖1.
The last inequality holds since each equilibrium price is bounded above by B, the total
amount of money in the market. Thus, (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF ) is bounded above by B‖εt‖.
Summarizing, we have showed
ΦCPF(Mt+1,pt+1) ≤ (1− δ) · ΦCPF(Mt,pt) + (P +B)‖εt‖1,
i.e., ∆t = (P +B)‖εt‖1.
B.2 Dynamic Budgets
Here, we consider the cases when the buyers’ budgets are changing, while supplies and buyers’
utility functions are fixed.
ΦCPF(Mt+1,pt+1) = ΨCPF(Mt+1,pt+1)−Ψ∗,t+1CPF
=
 n∑
j=1
wj · pt+1j −
∑
i
bti · lnQi(pt+1) − Ψ∗,tCPF
 − ∑
i
(bt+1i − bti) · lnQi(pt+1) + (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF )
=
[
ΨCPF(Mt,pt+1)−Ψ∗,tCPF
] − ∑
i
(bt+1i − bti) · lnQi(pt+1) + (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF )
≤ (1− δ) · ΦCPF(Mt,pt) −
∑
i
(bt+1i − bti) · lnQi(pt+1) + (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF ).
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Ψ∗,t+1CPF =
n∑
j=1
wj · p∗,t+1j −
∑
i
bt+1i · lnQi(p∗,t+1)
=
n∑
j=1
wj · p∗,t+1j −
∑
i
bti · lnQi(p∗,t+1) −
∑
i
(bt+1i − bti) · lnQi(p∗,t+1)
≥ Ψ∗,tCPF −
∑
i
(bt+1i − bti) · lnQi(p∗,t+1).
Combining the above two inequalities yields
ΦCPF(Mt+1,pt+1) ≤ (1− δ) · ΦCPF(Mt,pt) +
∑
i
(bt+1i − bti) · ln
Qi(p∗,t+1)
Qi(pt+1)
.
Cheung et al. [10, Section 6.3] showed that in the static market setting, if the initial prices
are neither too high nor too low, then Qi(p
∗,t+1)
Qi(pt+1) has time-independent upper and lower
bounds. In the dynamic market setting, we assume that there exists a constant C ≥ 1 such
that the budget of each buyer i changes within the range [b0i /C,C · b0i ]. Let U∗, L∗ be the
time-independent upper and lower bounds derived in [10], for the static market setting with
b = (b01, . . . , b0m). Following the argument in [10], their upper bound on pt+1k can be carried
through to the dynamic market setting by increasing by a factor of C, while their lower
bound on pt+1k can be carried through to the dynamic market setting by shrinking by a
factor of 1/C; these hold similarly for the equilibrium prices. Thus, for the dynamic market
setting, we have time-independent upper and lower bounds on Qi(p
∗,t+1)
Qi(pt+1) of values C
2 · U∗
and L∗/C2 respectively. Thus, by setting
C ′ := max
{ ∣∣ln(C2 · U∗)∣∣ , ∣∣ln(L∗/C2)∣∣ } ,
we have
ΦCPF(Mt+1,pt+1) ≤ (1− δ) · ΦCPF(Mt,pt) + C ′ ·
∑
i
∣∣bt+1i − bti∣∣ ,
i.e., ∆t = C ′ ·∑i ∣∣bt+1i − bti∣∣.
B.3 Dynamic Buyer Utility
Here, we consider the cases when the buyers’ utility function are changing, while supplies
and budgets are fixed. The changes to utility functions induce changes to the functions Qti.
ΦCPF(Mt+1,pt+1) = ΨCPF(Mt+1,pt+1)−Ψ∗,t+1CPF
=
 n∑
j=1
wj · pt+1j −
∑
i
bi · lnQti(pt+1) − Ψ∗,tCPF
 − ∑
i
bi · ln Q
t+1
i (pt+1)
Qti(pt+1)
+ (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF )
=
[
ΨCPF(Mt,pt+1)−Ψ∗,tCPF
] − ∑
i
bi · ln Q
t+1
i (pt+1)
Qti(pt+1)
+ (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF )
≤ (1− δ) · ΦCPF(Mt,pt) −
∑
i
bi · ln Q
t+1
i (pt+1)
Qti(pt+1)
+ (Ψ∗,tCPF −Ψ∗,t+1CPF ).
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Ψ∗,t+1CPF =
n∑
j=1
wj · p∗,t+1j −
∑
i
bi · lnQt+1i (p∗,t+1)
=
n∑
j=1
wj · p∗,t+1j −
∑
i
bi · lnQti(p∗,t+1) −
∑
i
bi · ln Q
t+1
i (p∗,t+1)
Qti(p∗,t+1)
≥ Ψ∗,tCPF −
∑
i
bi · ln Q
t+1
i (p∗,t+1)
Qti(p∗,t+1)
.
Combining yields
ΦCPF(Mt+1,pt+1) ≤ (1− δ) · ΦCPF(Mt,pt) +
∑
i
bi · ln
(
Qt+1i (p∗,t+1)
Qti(p∗,t+1)
· Q
t
i(pt+1)
Qt+1i (pt+1)
)
.
Starting from the initial utility values, each aij can in each round be changed by some
multiplicative factor χtij . Let χt = maxi,j((χtij)−1/ρ, (χtij)1/ρ) and χ = maxt χt. Note that
(1− c)/c = −1/ρ, so 1/χt ≤ Qt+1i (p)/Qti(p) ≤ χt for any price vector p. Thus,∣∣∣∣ln(Qt+1i (p∗,t+1)Qti(p∗,t+1) · Q
t
i(pt+1)
Qt+1i (pt+1)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 lnχt,
and hence
ΦCPF(Mt+1,pt+1) ≤ (1− δ) · ΦCPF(Mt,pt) + 2B lnχt,
i.e., ∆t = 2B lnχt.
C Further Applications
C.1 Gradient Descent on Shifting Strongly Convex Functions
In this section, we analyze the performance of gradient descent on a sequence of convex
functions satisfying α-strong convexity and β smoothness. Specifically, let F(α, β) be a
family of convex functions where each function is β-smooth and α-strongly convex. Any
individual function in this family is parameterized by the minimizing point of the function.
It is known that gradient descent algorithm converges geometrically for smooth and strongly
convex functions. Specifically, if x∗ is the minimizing point of the function and xt is the
point chosen by gradient descent update in round t, then:
I Theorem 11 (Theorem 3.12, [6]). Let f be a β-smooth and α-strongly convex function.
Then gradient descent algorithm with step size ηt ≤ 2α+β on f satisfies∥∥xt+1 − x∗∥∥2 ≤ (1− 2ηtαβ
α+ β
)∥∥xt − x∗∥∥2 .
Since the gradient descent dynamic converges rapidly in the static case, one would expect
the dynamic to also closely follow the minimizing point when the underlying function shifts
only a little bit every round. We formalize this notion next.
We note that the system can be viewed as an instance of the Lyapunov dynamical system
described in Section 4 where the gradient descent update is the evolution rule, the optimum
point x∗,t the system parameter in round t and the distance Gx∗,t(x) = ‖x− x∗,t‖ the
Lyapunov function. If we denote by ∆t =
∥∥x∗,t+1 − x∗,t∥∥, then Gx∗,t+1 ≤ Gx∗,t + ∆t. We
obtain the following proposition.
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I Proposition 12. Let F(α, β) be a family of α-strongly convex and β-smooth functions and
let f t ∈ F be the function chosen by the system in round t.
1. For Φ(x∗,t, xt) = Gx∗,t(xt), ∆t :=
∥∥x∗,t+1 − x∗,t∥∥ and δ = 2ηtαβα+β , we have
Φ(x∗,T , xT ) ≤ (1− δ)T/2 · Φ(x∗,0, x0) +
T∑
t=1
(1− δ)T−t2 ·∆t .
2. Further, if ∆t ≤ d for all rounds t, then:
Φ(x∗,T , xT ) ≤ (1− δ)T/2 · Φ(x∗,0, x0) + 2d
δ
.
Proof. The first part follows from Theorem 6 and the fact that
∥∥xt+1 − x∗,t∥∥ ≤ (1− δ)1/2 ‖xt − x∗,t‖.
The second part follows by taking the sum of the geometric series. J
The proposition implies that irrespective of the starting position, the gradient descent
dynamic follows the optima such that the chosen sequence of points are always approximately
within 2d/δ of the optimal.
A Remark on Regret. The bound in Proposition 12(2) can be extended to obtain
corresponding guarantees in terms of regret.
∑
t
f t(xt)− f t(x∗,t) ≤
∑
t
β
2
∥∥xt − x∗,t∥∥2 ≤ ∑
t
β
2
(
(1− δ)t/2Φ(x∗,0, x0) + 2d
δ
)2
≤ β
∑
t
((
(1− δ)t/2Φ(x∗,0, x0)
)2
+
(
2d
δ
)2)
≤ βd
δ
(
Φ(x∗,0, x0)
)2 + βT (2d
δ
)2
.
The first inequality follows by β-smoothness of the functions. This bound implies that
the average regret incurred as the dynamic approaches the region of radius 2d/δ from the
optimal point is bounded by a constant.
C.2 Load Balancing with Dynamic Machine Speed
Consider a setting with n distinct machines all connected to each other to form an arbitrary
network. For ease of notation, we label the machines as mi for i = 1 to n. Each machine mi
can process jobs at speed si. Jobs/tasks, assumed to be infinitely divisible, of total weight
M are arbitrarily distributed over the network. Our goal is to design a decentralized load
balancing algorithm with the objective that the total processing time over all machines is
minimized.
Before proceeding, we set up some notation. s denotes the vector of machine speeds.
`(t) = (`(t)i )i denotes the vector of loads and f (t) = (f
(t)
i )i the corresponding finishing times
at round t. We assume throughout that the total load stays constant i.e.
∑
i `
(t)
i = M . For
machine speed s, f∗,s denotes the corresponding vector of finishing times in the balanced
state, i.e. a state where the finishing time of all machines is the same.
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Algorithm 1: Diffusion
1 for t = 1 to T do
2 for each machine mi do
3 f
(t)
i ←
total processing time on mi
4 broadcast f (t)i to all j ∈ nbd(mi)
5 forall j ∈ nbd(mi) do
6 if f (t)i > f
(t)
j then send
Pij(f (t)i − f (t)j )si load to j.
Algorithm 1 is based on the diffusion
principle [27], where if a machine has more
jobs than its neighbours, then some jobs
diffuse to the neighbour. In our context,
since the goal is to equalize the finishing
times of all machines, the number of jobs
that diffuse is proportional to the difference
in the finishing times. The proportionality
constant depends on the connecting edge.
Specifically, in the algorithm that follows
we use a diffusivity matrix P satisfying the
following conditions: (a) Pii ≥ 1/2 (b) Pij >
0 iff (i, j) is an edge in G. (c) P is symmetric
and stochastic, i.e., for every machine mi,
∑
j Pij = 1.
If each machine mi uses the load balancing protocol as described above, then the finishing
time of machine mi at time t+ 1 is:
f
(t+1)
i =
`
(t+1)
i
si
= 1
si
`(t)i − n∑
j=1
Pij
(
`
(t)
i
si
− `
(t)
j
sj
)
si

= 1
si
`(t)i − n∑
j=1
Pij`
(t)
i +
n∑
j=1
Pij
`
(t)
j
sj
si

= 1
si
 n∑
j=1
Pijf
(t)
j si
 = (Pf (t))
i
It therefore follows that f (t+1) = P f (t). Further, in the balanced state f∗, since the finishing
time of all machines is the same,
(P f∗)i =
n∑
j=1
Pijf
∗
j = f∗i
n∑
j=1
Pij = f∗i
i.e. P f∗ = f∗. If we denote the error in round t+ 1 by e(t+1), then:
e(t+1) = f (t+1) − f∗ = P (f (t) − f∗) = Pe(t)
i.e. the same transformations apply to the error vector as well. Since P is a symmetric
matrix, it has n eigenvalues λ1, λ2 · · ·λn and linearly independent corresponding eigenvectors.
By theory of Markov chains, it is also known that 1 = |λ1| ≥ |λ2| ≥ · · · |λn|. Since P scales
the length of e(t) by a factor of ≤ |λ2|:∥∥∥e(t+1)∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥Pe(t)∥∥∥ ≤ |λ2|∥∥∥e(t)∥∥∥ ⇒ ∥∥∥e(t+1)∥∥∥ ≤ |λ2|t ∥∥∥e(0)∥∥∥ . (12)
For a given speed vector s, one can define the “potential" as the normed distance:
∥∥f (t) − f∗,s∥∥1.
This measures the imbalance in the network in terms of the finishing times. From (12), since
the error vector e converges to zero linearly, the potential at balanced state is zero. Note
that this load balancing setting is identical to the Lyapunov dynamical system introduced in
Section 4. Specifically, the speed vector s is the system parameter, the evolution function
F (`(t)) is the diffusion process as described in Algorithm 1 and the potential as mentioned
above corresponds to the Lyapunov function Gs(`(t)) = Gts. Note that by (12) it follows that
Gt+1s ≤ |λ2|tG0s . In the following, all norms are assumed to be L1 norms.
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I Proposition 13. For a speed vector s and an arbitrary load profile vector `, let f denote
the corresponding finishing time vector. For a Lyapunov function defined as Gs = ‖f − f∗,s‖,
if the speed vector changes to s′ for the same load profile, then:
Gs′ ≤ Gs + Mn
∣∣∣∣ 1‖s′‖ − 1‖s‖
∣∣∣∣ .
Proof. For speed vector changes s′ and the same load profile, the Lyapunov function is given
by:
Gs′ =
∥∥∥f − f∗,s′∥∥∥ ≤ ‖f − f∗,s‖ + ∥∥∥f∗,s′ − f∗,s∥∥∥ = Gs + ∥∥∥f∗,s′ − f∗,s∥∥∥ . (13)
Let `i denote the load on machine mi. The optimal load on the machines in a balanced
state can be characterized using the following optimization problem:
min
∑
i
`i
si
s.t
∑
i
`i = M.
Using the underlying symmetry, we can claim that the load on any machine mi in the
balanced state and its corresponding finishing time are `∗i = si·M∑
k
sk
and f∗,si =
`∗i
si
= M∑
k
sk
respectively. It then follows that:
∥∥∥f∗,s′ − f∗,s∥∥∥ = ∑
i
∣∣∣∣∣`
′∗
i
s′i
− `
∗
i
si
∣∣∣∣∣ = ∑
i
∣∣∣∣ M∑
k s
′
k
− M∑
k sk
∣∣∣∣ = Mn ∣∣∣∣ 1‖s′‖ − 1‖s‖
∣∣∣∣ . J
To formalize the problem, let LB(N,M) be a family of load balancing environments
where N denotes the network of underlying machines and M the total weight of jobs. Each
individual environment LBs ∈ LB(N,M) is parameterized by the machine-speed vector s.
The corresponding potential (also Lyapunov) function is denoted by Gs.
I Proposition 14. Let LB(N,M) be a family of load balancing environments on n machines
with the corresponding diffusivity matrix being PN . Let s0, s1, · · · , sT denote the vector of
machine speeds at times 0, 1 · · ·T respectively. If we denote by λ2 the second largest eigenvalue
of PN and Φ(st, `t) := Gst(`t), then
Φ(sT , `T ) ≤ |λ2|T · Φ(s0, `0) + Mn
T∑
t=1
|λ2|T−t ·
∣∣∣∣ 1‖st+1‖ − 1‖st‖
∣∣∣∣ .
Proof. The result follows from the fact that Gt+1s ≤ |λ2|Gts and Theorem 6. J
Since Φ is a measure of load imbalance in the network in terms of finishing times, the above
theorem implies that if the change in the speed vectors across rounds is small, then the
imbalance at time T is small and depends largely on the most recent changes.
D Generalization to PLCLDS using Bregman Divergence
Recently, in the context of mirror descent on convex functions, Cheung, Cole and Tao [12]
proposed a general framework for demonstrating linear convergence when the underlying
function is strongly Bregman convex, a new generalization of the standard notion of strong
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convexity. They use it to analyze proportional response dynamic (PRD) in static Fisher mar-
kets. We propose a variant of PLCLDS based on their framework that uses the generalization
of Bregman divergences as distance measure.
Let C be a compact and convex set. Given a differentiable convex function h(x) with
domain of C, the Bregman divergence generated by the kernel h is denoted by dh, defined as
dh(x,y) = h(x) − [ h(y) + 〈 ∇h(y) , x− y 〉 ] , ∀x ∈ C and y ∈ rint(C),
where rint(C) is the relative interior of C. A convex function f is (σ, L)-strongly Bregman
convex w.r.t. Bregman divergence dh if, 0 < σ ≤ L, and for any y ∈ rint(C) and x ∈ C,
f(y)+〈 ∇f(y) , x− y 〉+σ ·dh(x,y) ≤ f(x) ≤ f(y)+〈 ∇f(y) , x− y 〉+L ·dh(x,y).
Note that the KL divergence used in the analysis of proportional response dynamics
in Section 5 is an instance of Bregman divergence where the kernel function is h(x) =∑
j(xj · ln xj −xj). If the system is static, the variant of PLCLDS satisfies properties (a) and
(b), with property (c) replaced by the following new property: there exists positive numbers
q1 < q2 such that for any p,p∗ ∈ C,
G(F (p)) ≤ q1 · dh(p∗,p) − q2 · dh(p∗, F (p)). (14)
The above property holds when, for instance, G is a (σ, L)-strongly Bregman convex function
with minimum value zero, and F is a mirror descent update:
F (p) = arg min
p′
{ 〈 ∇G(p) , p′ − p 〉+ L · dh(p′,p) } ,
for which q1 = L− σ and q2 = L. [12]
By a suitable telescoping with (14), it is easy to show that G(pT ) ≤ q1 · (q1/q2)T−1 ·
dh(p∗,p0), where p∗ is any fixed point (equilibrium) of the Lyapunov system. However, for
system which is dynamic, we will need a modification of the above property, presented in the
theorem below.
I Theorem 15. Let L be a PLCLDS with δ ≡ δ(L) > 0. Let s0, s1, . . . , sT and p∗,0,p∗,1, . . . ,p∗,T
denote the sequence of system parameters and fixed points at times 0, 1, · · · , T , respectively
and let Φ(st,pt) = Gst(pt). Suppose that for every t = 1, . . . , T the system parameters
st−1, st ∈ Rd invoke a change such that the fixed points change from p∗,t−1 to p∗,t, and:
Φ(st,pt) ≤ q1 · dh(p∗,t−1,pt−1) − q2 · dh(p∗,t,pt) + ∆t,
If the initial control variable vector is denoted by p0, and the system evolves such that for
every t ≥ 1 we have pt = Fst−1(pt−1), then
Φ(sT ,pT ) ≤ q1 ·
(
q1
q2
)T−1
dh(p∗,0,p0) +
T−1∑
i=0
(
q1
q2
)i
∆T−i.
Proof. For t ≥ 1, the system is assumed to satisfy the perturbation property,
Φ(st,pt) ≤ q1 · dh(p∗,t−1,pt−1) − q2 · dh(p∗,t,pt) + ∆t. (15)
Note that if st−1 = st, the above assumption reduces to (14) since we can have p∗,t−1 =
p∗,t and ∆t = 0. Under this assumption, we can bound the Bregman divergence between the
control variable pt and any fixed point p∗,t in round t as
dh(p∗,t,pt) ≤ q1
q2
dh(p∗,t−1,pt−1) +
∆t
q2
.
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Since each term Φ(st,pt) and dh(p∗,t,pt) is non-negative, the potential at round T by
property (15) is:
Φ(sT ,p∗,T ) ≤ q1 · dh(p∗,T−1,pT−1) + ∆T
≤ q1
(
q1
q2
dh(p∗,T−2,pT−2) +
∆T−1
q2
)
+ ∆T
...
≤ q1 ·
(
q1
q2
)T−1
dh(p∗,0,p0) +
T−1∑
i=0
(
q1
q2
)i
∆T−i.
where the inequalities follow by recursive application of (15). J
